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ABSTRACT: The devastating magnitude M6.3 earthquake, that struck the city of 
Christchurch at 12:51pm on Tuesday 22 February 2011, caused widespread damage to the 
lifeline systems. Following the event, the Natural Hazard Research Platform (NHRP) of 
New Zealand funded a short-term project “Recovery of Lifelines” aiming to: 1) 
coordinate the provision of information to meet lifeline short-term needs; and to 2) 
facilitate the accessibility to lifelines of best practice engineering details, along with 
hazards and vulnerability information already available from the local and international 
scientific community. This paper aims to briefly summarise the management of the 
recovery process for the most affected lifelines systems, including the electric system, the 
road, gas, and the water and wastewater networks. Further than this, the paper intends to 
discuss successes and issues encountered by the “Recovery of Lifelines” NHRP project in 
supporting lifelines utilities.  
1 INTRODUCTION 
A magnitude 6.3 earthquake struck the city of Christchurch at 12:51pm on Tuesday 22 February 2011. 
The earthquake caused 182 fatalities, a large number of injuries, and resulted in widespread damage to 
the built environment. The Christchurch earthquake badly damaged over 6,000 residential and 
disrupted the main lifelines systems of the city (including the road, the water and wastewater networks 
and the electric systems) forcing thousands to leave their homes and communities. The February event 
compounded some of the effects of the 4 September 2010 earthquake, which did not directly result in 
any fatalities but did cause widespread property and infrastructure damage 
Following the 4 September and 22 February earthquakes in Canterbury, New Zealand, the Natural 
Hazard Research Platform (NHRP) of New Zealand funded various projects to support and inform the 
decision making process during the recovery phase. The “Recovery of Lifelines” short-term project 
was established and funded by the NHRP to support the recovery of lifelines in the Canterbury 
Region. The project aimed to inform and help meet the short-term operational needs of lifeline utilities 
by: 1) facilitating the accessibility to lifelines of best practice engineering details, along with hazards 
and vulnerability information already available from the local and international scientific community; 
2) informing the research community about the lifeline utility needs and information requirements. 
The project Principal Investigator, Dr Sonia Giovinazzi acted as a liaison person between the affected 
lifeline utilities, the National Engineering Lifeline Committee (NELC), the Canterbury Engineering 
Lifelines Group (CLUG) and the national and international research community to coordinate the 
provision of information and know-how. The project team included: Prof. Jarg Pettinga, Prof. Misko 
Cubrinovski, Dr Tom Wilson, Prof. Alan Nicholson, Ass. Prof. Neville Watson (University of 
Canterbury); Caroline Holden (GNS Science); Helen Grant (Environment Canterbury Regional 
Council); Mark Gordon (Canterbury Lifelines Utility Group).   
The first section of this paper provides a brief overview on the impact of the Christchurch earthquake 
on lifelines by briefly summarising the physical damage to the networks, the system performance and 
the operational response during the emergency management and the recovery phase. A complete 
description of the impact on lifelines of the 4 September Darfield and 22
nd
 February Canterbury 
earthquakes, is out of the scope of the paper and can be found in the reconnaissance report from the 
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Technical Council of Lifelines Engineering, TCLEE (Eidinger and Tang, 2011). Further accounts on 
the performance and emergency management of lifelines systems following the Darfield and 
Canterbury earthquakes can be found in Giovinazzi et al. (2011), Cubrinovski et al. (2011), Palermo et 
al. (2011), Massie and Watson (2011), Transpower (2011a, 2011b). The second section of the paper 
shortly summarises the operational short-term needs and the information requirements identified and 
discussed with the lifelines utilities as part of the Recovery of Lifelines project. The third section of 
the paper briefly outlines the way in which the researchers involved in the Recovery of Lifelines 
NHRP project engaged with lifelines utilities to provide know-how and information that could support 
their short-term operational needs. Issues encountered and lessons learned are discussed in the 
conclusion of the paper.  
2 IMPACT AND POST-EARTHQUAKE RECOVERY OF LIFELINES IN CANTERBURY: A 
SHORT OVERVIEW 
2.1 Electric Power System  
The electric power system serving the Christchurch area is operated by two companies: Transpower 
and Orion. Transpower operates the high voltage nation-wide transmission system, with highest 
voltages in the Christchurch area of 220 kV, along with some 66 kV. Orion is the local power 
distribution company (the 3rd largest power distributor in New Zealand), which conveys power from 
Transpower to end user customers, via a low and medium voltage (66 kV, 33 kV, 11 kV and 400 V) 
underground and overhead distribution network.  
The resilience of the high-voltage transmission grid in the Canterbury and northern South Island 
region, was challenged by the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes (Transpower 
2011a; Transpower 2011b). However the impact from both earthquakes on the electrical stability and 
operation of both national grid and regional supply was negligible. In particular, following the 22 
February earthquake the power to the national grid was unaffected, while power to the feeders into 
Christchurch City and regional substations was unavailable for up to 4.5 hours while safety checks and 
minor repairs were made. After that, the supply at the transmission grid exit points was restored to full 
capacity (Transpower 2011b). 
The power distribution network was badly affected following the 22 February earthquake. The large 
ground deformation induced by the earthquake caused multiple faults in 66 kV and 11 kV 
underground distribution networks, inducing major power outages and loss of functionality to the 
power distribution system.  
Of the 66 kV underground cable network, 50% of cables were damaged, 30 km out of a total of 60 km. 
All major 66 kV cables, supplying Dallington & Brighton zone substations were damaged beyond 
repair and had to be abandoned. These cables were pairs of radial 66 kV 3-core aluminium (300 
mm2Al), oil filled, aluminium sheathed with an outer cover of semi-conducting plastic sheath over the 
aluminium (Orion AMP 2009). Multiple faults were also identified in the 66 kV underground cables 
located within and close by the Christchurch CBD, namely: cable from Transpower Addington GXP 
to Orion Armagh substation (oil filled cables); cable from Orion Lancaster to Orion Armagh district 
substation (and the copper cross-linked polyethylene cable, Cu XLPE,), installed in 2002 to provide 
additional system security to the Christchurch CBD (Figure 1a). As a matter of fact the vulnerability 
of oil filled cables to earthquake-induced differential ground settlements was previously identified by 
Orion as potential risks (Orion AMP, 2009). In particular the oil filled cable from Dallington to 
Bromley 66 kV (damaged beyond repair following the 22
nd
 February earthquake, as mentioned above) 
was identified at higher risk, being located in the area on the south side of the Avon River (Orion 
AMP, 2009). 
Of the 11 kV underground network 14% of the cables were damaged, 330 km out of a total of 2,300 
km. The affected 11 kV cables were either aluminium, or copper core cables of different length, 
diameters and types, including: paper lead; paper-insulated lead-covered, armoured, PILCA; PILCA 
HDPE cables, PILCA with a high density polyethylene HDPE outer jacket; cross-linked polyethylene, 
XLPE cables with PVC and HDPE protective outer jackets. 
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Damage to overhead lines (33 kV, 11 kV and 400 V) was relatively minor, including cracked 
insulators and poles affected by liquefaction.  
 
  
Figure 1. 66 kV underground cable distribution network: a) damage to 1600Cu XLPE cables; b) 
repair activities (photo credit Orion). 
Distribution building substations and zone substations (all strengthened as part of a $6 million seismic 
upgrade program that addressed all Orion substation buildings) performed well despite the ground 
motions exceeding the design codes of the seismic strengthening programme.  One zone substation 
(out of 51) suffered from liquefaction. Of 314 distribution building substations located in Christchurch 
urban area only 4 experienced significant damage. The Orion Administrative buildings, located in the 
CBD, were badly affected and were evacuated soon after the 22 February earthquake. The control 
centre was re-established within 2 hours in an adjacent building that did not suffer major damage 
Despite the severe physical impact of the earthquake on the Orion distribution and sub-transmission 
network, Orion was able to restore the power to about 50% of occupied households on the day of the 
event, 75% after 2 days, 90% within 10 days and 98% after 2 weeks. Temporary 66 kV overhead lines 
were installed on an emergency basis, within one-week, from Bromley to New Brighton (4 kilometre 
line) and from Bromley to the Orion Dallington substation (4.5 kilometre line) to ensure power supply 
to 20,000 customers in north-east Christchurch. More than 600 quake-related underground cable faults 
to both 11 kV and 66 kV cables were repaired within three months (Figure 1b). A total of more than 
1000 faults in the 11 kV underground network were identified and repaired within six months (Orion 
Media release 31st August 2011). 
Each of the cable faults took more than 12 hours to find and repair. The intensive post-earthquake 
work plan saw 700 electricity sector workers from around New Zealand and Australia contributing, 
under a mutual aid support agreement, more than 200,000 people-hours to earthquake recovery (Orion 
Media Release 22 June 2011). 
2.2 Road Network 
Road networks were extensively damaged by the significant liquefaction induced by the 22
nd
 February 
earthquake that resulted in settlement, lateral spreading, sand boils and a large quantity of ejected silt, 
mud and water ponding on the road surface (Ciubrinovsky et al. 2011). Most of the State Highways 
remained open. Local roads in the eastern suburbs of the city were the most affected. Eighty-three 
sections of 57 roads were closed. Five of the 6 bridges crossing the lower Avon River were closed and 
many bridges required weight restrictions. Substantial temporary traffic management measures were 
put in place to manage the residual functionality of the road network: including temporary speed 
restrictions (30 kph); adjustments to traffic signals; and adjustments to bus routes. Despite the 
temporary traffic management measures and the effective programme to speed-up the liquefaction 
clean-up operations (Villemure et al. 2011) congestion remained problematic for months following the 
earthquake. Pre-earthquake seismic improvements to bridges on State Highways 73 and 74 proved 
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successful in resisting substantial loads and keeping the highways in operation post-earthquake.   
Rockfalls in the Port Hills led to several key road closures due to roads being blocked and were an on-
going hazard from unstable rocks (Figure 2a). Closure included Evans Pass, which provides a vital 
link for oversized or explosive goods between Lyttelton Port and the city via Sumner, and Main Road 
which links the south-eastern suburbs of Redcliffs and Sumner to the city.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Earthquake-Induced Damage to the Highway System: a) RockFalls in Port Hills 
following 4th September 2011 (yellow) and 22
nd
 February 2011 (Red), threatening Tunnel Road 
State Highway 74, (Image credit Max Letham); b) Liquefaction induced flooding on highways.  
2.3 Water and Wastewater Networks  
Christchurch water and waste networks suffered extensive damage as a result of the 22 February 2011 
earthquake. 36,000 water and wastewater service requests were received and addressed by 
Christchurch City Council (CCC), which owns and manages the city’s water and wastewater 
networks, in 5 months following the earthquake. Approximately, 50% of the city was without water 
for the first days following the earthquake; more than a third of households were without water for 
over a week. A month on from 22 February 2011, over 95% of occupied units (outside of the cordoned 
Christchurch CBD) had water, however a “boil order” was in-place for over six weeks for most of the 
city due to potential contamination caused by severe damage to the wastewater system. Chlorination, 
which was not used pre-earthquake, remained a requirement until 7 December 2011. Water 
conservation orders are in place as a result of damages to key water reservoirs and the loss of many 
groundwater pumping wells; all related to geotechnical problems. However, with few exceptions water 
reservoir structures and pump stations performed very well owing to pre-earthquake engineering and 
seismic upgrades (Charman and Billings, 2011).  
The city continued to rely heavily on a temporary sewage service facilitated by chemical and portable 
toilets to supplement the fractured and fragile wastewater system for several month following the 22 
February earthquake (Stevenson et al. 2011). Christchurch City Council set a target of returning sewer 
services to all homes by the end of August (6 months following the quake) and contractors have been 
working 24 hours a day, seven days a week since early March to achieve this goal. At 31 August work 
was completed on all public sewer pipes, but around 800 houses where out of service due to the 
damage to their private sewer pipes. Raw sewage continues to be disposed in the rivers and estuaries 
due to the inability to treat the waste as a result of significant liquefaction induced damage at the 
Bromley Waste Water Treatment Plant. The treatment plant has been unable to perform any more then 
partial primary treatment since the 22 February earthquake. Some sewage is bypassed directly to the 
sewerage ponds and some pumped directly into rivers. Concerns abound about the sewerage ponds 
becoming anaerobic and emitting a stench across the city. The treatment plant was also repeatedly 
damaged by sand and silt, which flowed into broken sewage pipes when the ground liquefied, 
continually washed into the basins. The plant was not designed for such heavy solids.  
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The water system restoration activities completed within six months time following the 22 February 
earthquake included: construction of 12 km of pressure main, reparation of 60 water supply wells, 
renewal of 150 km of water main and of 100 km of submain. It will take years to return the water and 
wastewater systems to pre-earthquake functions (Mark Christison, personal communication). 
2.4 Gas Distribution System  
Contact Energy (Rockgas) operates the Liquefied Petroleum Gas, (LPG) distribution system in 
Christchurch with a reticulated pipe network comprising of approximately 180 km of medium density 
polyethylene, (MDPE), pipes. The LPG network is supplied from one main feed plant, Woolston 
Terminal supplemented by a pressure peaker plant, and three backup plants. The distribution network 
is subdivided into 189 separately valved zones that can be manually shut off.  
Following the 22 February main shock, the feed supplies into the system were shut off, as a 
precaution. The system was re-livened, starting 23 February, section by section following the positive 
outcome of a drop test (no leakages detected) after proof residual gas pressure was found within the 
section. No damage was observed both to the MDPE distribution pipes and to their welded joints, 
despite the gas pipes were located in zones that experienced severe liquefaction and ground 
deformations. The gas system performance in the 22 February earthquake (and in the 4th September 
2010 Darfield earthquake and 13 June 2011 aftershock) was remarkably good compared to the 
performance of reticulated gas networks following large earthquakes in other parts of the world 
(Figure 3a), especially those where the use of cast iron and other older transmission and distribution 
pipe is still common (Schiff, 1995, 1998). 
Lessons learnt following the Kobe earthquake and the participation in the emergency preparedness 
activities encouraged by the Canterbury Lifelines Utilities Group strongly influenced the design of a 
highly resilient system (Figure 3b) with robust and redundant hardware and suitable preparedness 
thanks to the availability of back-up resources (Smith and Yu, personal communication). 
3 MEETING LIFELINES UTILITIES AND ASSESSING SHORT-TERM RECOVERY 
NEEDS  
One of the primary objectives of the NHRP short-term project on Recovery of Lifelines was to 
establish and maintain communication with affected lifeline utilities to identify specific short-term 
needs and to discuss long-term modelling and analysis needs.  
The Principal Investigator (PI) of the “Recovery of Lifelines” project, Dr Sonia Giovinazzi and the 
Canterbury Lifelines Utility Group, CLUG, representative, Mark Gordon, met with representatives of 
the main lifelines utilities to discuss with them their specific needs during the recovery phase. 
Meetings were held with affected lifeline utilities, in particular with representatives from power 
(Orion, Transpower); telecommunications (Chorus); water and wastewater (Waimakariri District 
Council) and transport utilities (New Zealand Transport Agency, CCC road and bridges staff). Further 
to the meetings, regular e-mail communication was instituted with the affected lifeline utilities to 
ensure a two-way liaison with the scientific community.  
From the meetings held with each utility company, specific short-terms needs were identified and 
discussed (Table 1).  
Table 1. Lifelines utilities short-term needs during post-earthquake recovery 
Power 
Analysis of seismic performance of underground cables and identification of the multiple causes of the damage 
to the underground network 
Assessment of the residual/future functionality of affected power underground cables 
Seismic Scenario Analysis for assessing and comparing alternative solutions to built permanent capacity in the 
eastern suburbs of Christchurch 
Assessing earthquake risk to underground lines versus wind and snow-storm risk to overhead lines 
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Assessing cable-bridge interactions and coordinating repair activities with road and bridge 
Telecommunication 
Assessing residual/future functionality of stretched copper cabling 
Existing standards/procedures to straighten the cellular network towers out of plumb due to liquefaction 
Seismic Scenario Analysis for assessing and comparing alternatives solutions to replace damaged exchanges 
Highway and Urban Road  
Assessing and accounting, within repair/rebuilding designing procedures, for the increased risk of flooding in-
duced by the subsidence phenomena observed following the earthquakes (Figure 2b) 
Assessing and mitigating the rock-fall risk on roads induced by the earthquakes and following aftershocks  
Water and wastewater  
Documenting and analysing the seismic performance of different buried pipes typologies (material/age) to identi-
fy the less vulnerable solutions for repairing and rebuilding 
Identifying techniques and tools to support the prioritisation of repairing/reconstruction activities and to justify 
costs of earthquake resistant solutions  
Defining a method and a tool for automatically mapping and assessing earthquake-induced damage to sewage 
network, starting from CCTV (closed circuit television) footage   
Gas  
Existing standards/procedures to seismically design Liquefied Petroleum Gas feed plant 
Longer-term modelling and analysis needs identified by lifelines utilities and discussed as part of the 
“Recovery Project” have been summarised in a document prepared for the National Engineering 
Lifelines Committee (NELC) and NHRP. The document has been used by NELC as a reference to 
identify infrastructure research priorities in New Zealand (Neo Leaf Global Ltd 2011).  
4 INFORMATION AND KNOW-HOW PROVISION IN SUPPORT TO LIFELINES SHORT-
TERM RECOVERY NEEDS  
The information and know-how provided in response to the lifelines short-term needs are shortly 
presented below. Specific requests from the lifelines utilities are summarised into five main areas, 
namely:  
1) standards, guidelines and best-practices for repair/retrofitting and designing earthquake-resistant 
lifelines systems; 
2) best-practices for documenting and analysing the performance and damage of lifelines during the 
Canterbury earthquake sequence;  
3) procedures for assessing the residual/future functionality of affected components;  
4) best-practices for estimating the expected performance and risk of alternative repair and/or 
reconstruction strategies in case of further earthquakes;  
5) procedures for reporting/documenting the lessons learned from the earthquakes before the 
knowledge is lost. 
4.1 Standards, guidelines and best practices for repairing damaged lifelines components, for 
retrofitting existing assets and for designing earthquake resistant and/or multi-hazard resistant 
lifelines systems 
A revision of existing standards for repairing, retrofitting and designing earthquake-resistant lifelines 
component is out of the scope of this paper and was out of the scope of the Recovery of Lifelines 
project. This section aims to briefly summarise what was discussed with the lifelines utilities in 
response to their request for existing standards and guidelines to be used as a reference for repairing, 
designing and retrofitting activities.        
In 1996 a plan for developing and adopting seismic design guidelines and standards for lifelines was 
prepared in the United States by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with private 
sector input (FEMA 271). The American Lifelines Alliance (ALA) a public-private partnership 
between FEMA and the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) was initiated with financial 
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support from FEMA in 1998 with a primary goal of facilitating the development and improvement of 
the design of key utility (electric power, telecommunication, water, waste water, oil, natural gas, rail, 
and shipping ports) and transportation systems, to achieve the desired level of performance in natural 
hazards (Honegger et al. 2003).   
Multi-hazard design of lifelines components and multi-hazard analysis of existing lifelines components 
- To assist in identifying gaps in existing knowledge or practice, ALA prepared matrices of existing 
guidelines and standards (ALA, 2004) for the design and/or analysis of existing components of lifeline 
systems accounting for the loads from natural hazards, (earthquake, wind, snow and ice) and man-
induced hazards (cyber, radiological, chemical or blasts). Lifelines systems accounted for within the 
ALA guidelines and standards matrices include: oil products systems; natural gas systems; water 
system (potable and raw); wastewater systems; telecommunication systems; port and inland 
waterways; highways and roads; railroad (Figure 4).  
ALA matrices include USA guidelines and standards only. The European Commission, the Japan 
Society of Civil Engineers, the Indian National Center for Earthquake Engineering, among others, 
have issued further guidelines and standards for the seismic design of lifelines components, e.g.: i) 
Eurocode-8: Design Provisions for Earthquake Resistance of Structures, Part-4: Silos, Tanks and 
Pipelines, (Eurocode, 2004); ii) Basic Principles of Seismic Design and Construction for Water Supply 
Facilities (JSCE, 2000a); iii) Recommended Practices for Earthquake Resistant Design of Gas 
Pipelines (JSCE 2000b); iv) IITK-GSDMA Guidelines for seismic design of buried pipelines (NICEE 
2007).   
Techniques and practices for seismic retrofitting lifelines components and systems - Seismic 
retrofitting techniques for components and systems are reviewed (including the benefits of retrofitting 
versus gradual replacement) and described in different hazard-specific and utility-specific documents 
and reports from ASCE, FEMA and ALA e.g.: i) Seismic Design and Retrofit of Piping Systems 
(ALA 2002); ii) Earthquake Resistant Construction of Electric Transmission and Telecommunication 
Facilities Serving the Federal Government (FEMA 202, 1990); iii) Earthquake Resistant Construction 
of Gas and Liquid Fuel Pipeline Systems Serving or Regulated by the Federal Government. (FEMA 
233, 1992); iv) Guidelines for the Seismic Upgrade of Water Transmission Facilities (ASCE 1999).  
Techniques and practices for repairing damaged lifelines components following earthquakes – A 
summary report and/or specific guidelines on techniques and practices for post-earthquake repairing of 
lifelines components could not be identified during the period of the project. The suggestion was made 
to look for specific examples in the many reconnaissance reports available from ASCE and ALA.   
4.2 Best-practice for documenting and analysing the performance of affected lifelines during the 
Canterbury earthquake sequence  
Lifeline utilities were advised on the need to document the damage sustained by the components of 
their networks, and on the need to analyse the relationships among the observed damage and the:  
ground motion, earthquake-induced permanent and transient ground deformation, groundwater, and 
surface and subsurface conditions at the location of the network components.  
Detailed information on how to perform a post-earthquake vulnerability analysis can be derived from 
international literature. A detailed overview on how to analyse and represent the relationship between 
buried lifeline damage and various seismic parameters is provided in O’Rourke and Jeon (1999). ALA 
(2001) provides a complete guide on the formulation of seismic fragility curves for water system 
based on post-earthquake damage data processing.   
As an easy and operative rule of thumb the following three steps were suggested to affected lifeline 
utilities:  
Step 1. Collect, classify and represent within a Geographical Information System the damage and 
repair activities to the affected lifelines components following the 4 September 2010, 22 February 
2011 and 13 June 2011 earthquakes;  
Step 2. Overlay GIS layers of the damage sustained by their network, and vector or raster maps of the 
ground motion, ground deformation and soil conditions recorded/observed at the location of their 
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networks and affected components; 
Step 3. Estimate and represent the relationship between lifeline damage, the seismic input and 
liquefaction-induced ground deformations to get a first understanding of the seismic performance of 
the network components (and of different typologies of components, e.g. material/age, if applicable).  
Figure 3 shows some preliminary maps and results of the damage to lifelines systems overlaid with the 
few maps and data on liquefaction induced ground-damage that were made available to the Recovery 
of Lifelines project (Table 2).  In particular Figure 3a shows checks and repair activities to the 
wastewater network following 4 September 2011 earthquake. Figure 3b shows the percent of total 
length of different pipe materials within different ground deformation areas. Figure 3c shows the 
performance of pipes of different materials for the Kaiapoi water network following the 4 September 
earthquake. High Density Polyethylene (HDPE) pipes showed excellent performance.  
Table 2. Ground-motion and land damage data and maps requirements and availability at the 
time of the Recovery of Lifelines project 
 Maps and data description Availability  
Ground-motion GeoNet Strong Motion Database - Strong 
motions records available at the location of the 
132 GeoNet strong motion stations (GeoNet 
2011) 
Available at the location station 
point (derived interpolated 
maps)  
Land damage: 
liquefaction induced soil 
failure,            
surface fault rupture,  
rock fall.  
Liquefaction drive-through reconnaissance map 
mapping surface evidence of liquefaction on 
roads and adiaject areas (Cubrinovski and 
Taylor, 2011).  
Available (raster format).  
Land damage to residential areas (Tonkin and 
Taylor, 2011), commissioned by the Earthquake 
Commission (EQC) 
Available to the project team 
only. Not available to lifelines 
utilities due to confidentiality 
issues* 
LIDAR data Not available to the project 
Damage to underground water waste-water and 
sewage network to be used for microzoning 
purposes (O’Rourke and Jeon, 1999) 
Not available to the project 
Surface and shallow soil 
conditions 
Groundwater data 
 Geology map of the Christchurch Urban Area 
1: 50,000 (Brown and Weeber, 1992); 
Available (raster format) 
 Ground-water table Available 
 “Swamp to City” Christchurch Drainage Board 
(Wilson, 1989) 
Available (raster format) 
In-situ tests commissioned by EQC* Not available to the project* 
* These data and maps were made available by the Earthquake Commission, by publishing on the EQC website, 
http://canterbury.eqc.govt.nz/news/reports from late November 2011/middle December 2010 (The Recovery of Lifelines pro-
ject was already concluded at that time). Maps representing EQC in-situ tests and further maps can be found on 
https://CanterburyRecovery.ProjectOrbit.com/ web site.  
 
4.3 Procedures for assessing the residual/future functionality of affected components 
Lifelines utilities were advised that laboratory tests were necessary to support the assessment of the 
residual and future functionality of affected components. As an example in case of damaged 
underground cables it would have been necesssary to assess: 1) possible increasingly damaging effects 
with higher levels of ground deformation, starting with deformation leading to impaired electrical 
conductivity, to increased loss of electric flow, to full electric power disruption; 2) states of 
deformation leading to loss of electric stability over time; 3) levels of deformation that break down 
insulation from groundwater effects (Prof. O’Rourke personal communication). 
Paper 090 
 
a) 
b) 
c) 
Figure 3. Kaiapoi waste-water and water networks following the 4 September Darfield 
Earthquake: a) map representing checks and repair activities to the wastewater network; b) 
Percent of total length of different pipe materials of the water network within different ground 
deformation areas (courtesy of Anna Mason); c) Number of repairs made on mains and rider 
mains in different levels of ground deformation areas. (Knight, 2011). 
 
4.4 Best-practices for estimating the expected performance and risk of alternative repair and/or 
reconstruction strategies in the event of further earthquakes 
Lifeline utilities were advised that running scenarios analysis would have been the ideal approach for 
comparing different alternatives envisaged by lifeline utilities during the recovery phase, to replace 
damaged component and/or to rebuild permanent capacity where temporary solutions were adopted 
(Figure 3).  
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As part the Recovery of Lifelines project, the attempt was made to collect and provide the following 
necessary information for running scenario analysis: 1) subsurface structure and earthquake likelihood 
for the specification of hazard scenarios (epicentre location, moment magnitude, directivity 
parameters); 2) ground motion predictive models on rock and models for representing soil -
amplifications (New Zealand-specific and calibrated on Canterbury earthquake data); 3) ground 
deformation and land damage predictive models (New Zealand-specific and calibrated on Canterbury 
earthquake data).  
 
  
Figure 4: Estimating the expected performance and risk of alternative repair and/or 
reconstruction strategies: a) planning for permanent electric distribution network in north-east 
Christchurch; b) preliminary hazard scenario modelling for the Alpine Fault (Holden and Zhao, 
2011), picture courtesy of Caroline Holden.  
A preliminary hazard scenario modelling for the Alpine Fault (Holden and Zhao, 2011) was made 
available to the lifeline utilities on request. Synthetic seismograms in Christchurch (computed 
broadband 0.5-20hz), and derived ground-motion measures, for a large potential Alpine Fault 
earthquake were made available for the study from Holden and Zhao (2011). At first seismograms 
were computed for rock site condition. In order to account for soft soil conditions, site effects 
equivalent to a site class D (e.g. Botanic Garden in Christchurch) were added to the “rock-site” 
seismograms (work by John Zhao). Synthetic seismograms, including various site effects, could have 
been computed for specific locations of particular interest for the lifelines utilities (e.g. location of 
main components of the lifeline networks) provided the availability of soil profile data for the specific 
site location of interest.  
Similar hazard scenario modelling for the Greendale Fault causing the 4 September 2010 earthquake 
and for the other Christchurch local faults causing the many aftershocks were not made available at the 
time of the project.    
A predictive model for assessing liquefaction susceptibility and liquefaction induced ground 
deformation at territorial authority scale and at different detailed levels was proposed by Giovinazzi 
and Cubrinovsky (2007).  However, due to the lack of the necessary data (e.g. in-situ tests, Table 2) 
the model could not be implemented to assess the liquefaction susceptibility for the purposes of the 
“Recovery of Lifelines” project. Reference was therefore made to the “Liquefaction hazard map” and 
“Liquefaction ground damage map” (Beca, 2005). 
Simplified analysis and discussions to support urgent recovery decision making processes of lifeline 
utilities were performed as part of the Recovery of Lifelines project based on these maps and on the 
data and information available (Table 2).  
It is worth highlighting that a liquefaction susceptibility review study is currently underway at 
Environment Canterbury (Environment Canterbury media-release 25/11/2011). The project is jointly 
funded by Environment Canterbury  and the Natural Hazards Research Platform (NHRP) with inputs 
from Christchurch City Council, Selwyn District Council and Waimakariri District Council. The 
project aims to analyse geological and geotechnical data derived both from the recent earthquakes and 
pre-earthquake information, held by research institutes, local authorities and private companies.  The 
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data will be processed according to a consistent methodology to produce updated liquefaction hazard 
information. Maps will be made available to city and district councils and lifelines utilities to guide 
future development (including the required level of geotechnical investigation for future 
development). Liquefaction Resistance Index Map for Christchurch City, based on expert-opinion and 
observed liquefaction-induced land damage following the Canterbury Earthquakes has been recently 
defined (Cubrinovski and Hughe, personal communication).   
4.5 Standardised procedures for reporting/documenting the lessons learned from the earthquakes 
before the knowledge is lost. 
Following a workshop sponsored by the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (Pasadena, CA 
2002) many issues and criticalities for the collection and management of earthquake data were 
identified and discussed (EERI, 2003). Table 3 summarises, from the EERI report, some of the 
criticalities and issues that affected the collection and management of earthquake data in the aftermath 
of 22 February earthquake.  
4.6 Standardised procedures for reporting/documenting the lessons learned from the earthquakes 
before the knowledge is lost. 
Following a workshop sponsored by the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (Pasadena, CA 
2002) many issues and criticalities for the collection and management of earthquake data were 
identified and discussed (EERI 2003). Table 3 summaries, from the EERI report, some of the 
criticalities and issues that affected the collection and management of earthquake data in the aftermath 
of 22 February earthquake.  
Table 3. Common criticalities and issues for the collection and management of post-earthquake 
hazard and damage data  
Lack of coordination: After earthquakes, multiple teams are in the field, performing reconnaissance and/or 
research. These teams may not be well coordinated, collecting the same data, and overlooking other critical and 
perishable data. 
Lack of repositories: Data that are collected are often stored by individual researchers and field investigators, 
making access by others difficult. 
Data maintenance and access: Difficulties in addressing and responding to issues of data access and data 
maintenance. 
Perishable data: Some of the data are extremely perishable. With little coordination and/or access, these data 
sometimes disappear before they can be collected. 
Different time frames for data collection: Different types of data need to be collected at different time periods 
before and after an earthquake. Some data are impossible to collect in the first few days after an earthquake, 
including accurate direct and indirect costs of the earthquake, complete damage surveys, extent of lifelines 
disruption, and rebuilding and reconstruction policies. Inventory data are, by definition, collected prior to an 
event. These different time frames mean that different tools are necessary for accessing and storing data. 
It is worth highlighting that ALA is working toward the development and implementing of a Post-
earthquake Information Management System (PIMS), an end-to-end system for post-hazard event data 
collection, archiving of data, and distribution of post-earthquake data for use to improve hazard 
mitigation. ALA is working to define: 1) the breadth of data that needs to be accommodated by PIMS; 
2) key issues not currently addressed through existing post-earthquake investigations; 3) necessary 
tools for storing, presenting, analyzing, and disseminating that information; 4) types of data searching 
and collating features that users would like to have (database searching, output format, GIS 
compatibility, etc.). 
The breadth of data to be collected for documenting the performance of lifelines systems and the 
societal and economic impact of their disruption was suggested as part of the Recovery of Lifelines 
project and is presented in Table 4.    
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Table 4. Data collection and data processing for consolidating the knowledge on the seismic 
response and impact of lifelines following Christchurch earthquakes 
Objective 1 – Consolidate the knowledge on the seismic response and impact of lifelines following 
Christchurch earthquakes;  
Task 1 - Data Collection – data related to the behaviour and impact of Christchurch and Waimakarir lifeline 
systems, following the 4 September, 22 February and 13
 
June earthquakes, will be collected according to the 
following categories: 
1.1 Network characteristics: systems structure, system components and sub-components;  
1.2 Component characteristics: design (e.g. construction year, seismic design), properties (e.g. material), 
geometry, geospatial representation;  
1.3 Seismic hazard and induced geotechnical hazard: ground shaking (recorded PGA), land damage (including 
liquefaction, lateral spreading, landslides and rock falls) at the location of the system components;  
1.4 Physical impact on the network component: (e.g. damage, disruption, deformation, etc.);  
1.5 Functional impact: loss/reduction of the system functionality (e.g. loss of connectivity; reduced 
serviceability);  
1.6 Social impacts of lifeline disruptions:  
1.7 Impact of lifeline disruptions on organisations: 
1.8 Direct and indirect economic losses:  
1.9 Interdependencies: Physical, Social, Economic Interdependencies  
1.10 Repair/restoration practices, strategies, times 
Task 2 – Data Processing   
2.1 Definition of taxonomies: physical damage classification scheme (to network component), system 
performance metrics, socio-economic performance indicators;  
2.2 Data elaboration according the above-defined taxonomies;  
2.3 Geospatial representation of data (according to a common agreed Geographical Information System)  
Task 3 – Data Dissemination (conditional to the agreement of the lifeline utilities) 
3.1 Data aggregation: to overcome confidentiality issues and allow for data disclosure;  
3.2 Develop an information sharing web centre (with restricted access) to allow the use of the aggregated data 
for national and international researchers  
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake created very strong ground motions and widespread 
liquefaction throughout the Christchurch urban area and surroundings, leading to significant damage 
and disruption of lifeline systems. It was well established that large areas of eastern Christchurch were 
built on ground highly susceptible to liquefaction, however seismic hazard assessments, prior to the 4 
September 2010 Darfield earthquake, never anticipated the possibility of a large earthquake occurring 
directly under the city. The 22 February 2011 earthquake exceeded hazard assessment estimates and 
design codes, yet many systems continued to function, albeit in a reduce state, mitigating the impact of 
the event on the Christchurch and New Zealand economies and communities. 
 
Weak buried pipes and cables, played a major role in the seismic response of the water, wastewater, 
telecommunication and power systems. The event highlighted the challenge of managing aging 
infrastructure, of which components are known to be vulnerable, but are too expensive to be 
replaced/upgraded in the short-term as part of risk mitigation programmes.  
The total lack of investment in the past in seismically-designed buried utilities in Christchurch and in 
New Zealand in general, cannot be overlooked. Wellington buried utilities are probably as seismically 
vulnerable as Christchurch ones. There are diverse private and public sector responsibilities for the 
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performance of lifeline systems. A call for action is needed 
 
On a positive note it is worth highlighting that the value of resilient design of non-buried lifeline 
components, interdependency planning, mutual assistance agreements, extensive insurance cover and 
highly trained and adaptable human resources were all success stories that contributed to mitigate 
lifelines disruption. The gas system showed an excellent level of robustness, remaining undamaged 
despite the high level of ground shaking and liquefaction-induced ground damage. The 
implementation of lessons learnt from previous damaging earthquakes contributed to the design of 
such a robust and redundant network. Limited interdependency issues were experienced between 
lifeline systems, with generally a good level of coordination and communication experienced among 
the lifeline utilities and with the Christchurch Response Centre. All the lifeline utilities had mutual aid 
agreements and contingency measures in place that helped them to guarantee the prompt availability 
of materials and technical experts required for the repair operations. Many of the lifeline utilities had 
the availability of back-up resources that helped them to cope with the reduced functionality of other 
networks.  
The 22 February earthquake also demonstrated that some emergency management and response issues 
have still to be addressed to improve future pre-event planning. The temporary traffic management of 
the highway and local road network faced severe challenges to adapt to the damaged network and to 
the reorganisation of the city, as businesses and residents relocated following the closure, demolition 
and rebuild of the CBD. The management of the CBD cordon caused frustration, as strict access 
protocols made it difficult for lifelines utilities and their contractors to service key sites. A police 
escort for utilities was provided sporadically upon request. The 22 February event has also exposed the 
difficulties in re-optimising a city's infrastructure following closure of its CBD for an extended period. 
The Christchurch earthquake has also shown that societal, economic and political expectations for a 
lifeline system’s functionality in a post-disaster environment continue to rise. The widespread 
disruption to services caused significant social impacts, leading to major economic disruption, political 
involvement and social trauma - which contributed in part to the migration of thousands of 
Christchurch residents out of affected areas. However, it has to be acknowledged that community 
members showed incredible levels of resilience, coping and adapting to the, sometime, long lifeline 
restoration times and repeated outages during aftershocks.  
The event has provided a wealth of lessons for increasing the resilience of engineering lifelines in New 
Zealand and beyond. This event will no doubt be regarded as a reference example of the impact of 
severe liquefaction-induced ground damage on lifeline systems and overall on an urban environment.  
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